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Introduction
We study the effects of oil price changes and other shocks on the creation and destruction of jobs in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Our study provides a richer characterization of sectoral job creation and destruction dynamics than previous research, and it produces new evidence related to the role of oil shocks in economic fluctuations. The evidence speaks to several questions: Through what transmission mechanisms do oil shocks influence aggregate and sectoral employment? How does the economy's dynamic response to oil shocks differ from its response to monetary shocks? How do the job creation and destruction responses to oil shocks vary among industries and among sectors that differ by capital and energy intensity in production, age of production facilities, size of employer, and durability of final product? How many manufacturing jobs are created and destroyed in response to oil price shocks, and over what time span?
Our empirical analysis exploits quarterly measures of sectoral job creation and destruction rates from 1972 to 1988. The detailed sectoral measures reflect tabulations of the plant-level data in the longitudinal research datafile (LRD), as described in . The sectoral detail enables us to better evaluate the role of oil shocks and helps discriminate among alternative interpretations of the apparent responses to oil shocks. For example, interpretations that stress the coincident behavior of monetary policy suggest a different pattern of sectoral responses than interpretations that stress the reallocative effects of oil shocks. The decomposition of sectoral employment changes into job creation and destruction components also helps interpret the response to oil shocks. A concrete example helps to develop this point and motivate our study.
Consider the impact of oil price shocks on the U.S. automobile industry. The OPEC oil price shock of 1973 increased the demand for small, fuel-efficient cars and simultaneously reduced the demand for larger cars. American automobile companies were poorly situated to respond to this shock, because their capital stock and work force were primarily directed toward the production of large cars. Consequently, capacity utilization and output fell in the wake of the oil price shock, even though a handful of plants equipped to produce small cars operated at peak capacity, as documented by Bresnahan and Ramey (1993) . This aspect of the auto industry's response to the 1973 oil price shock is difficult to discern and analyze with the aggregated data typically brought to bear on business cycle analysis. Even detailed industry-level data on output and employment can obscure the magnitude and nature of reallocative activity triggered by the shock.
The oil price shock adversely affected the closeness between the desired and actual characteristics of factor inputs in the auto industry along several dimensions. First, much of the physical capital in the auto industry was dedicated to the production of larger rather than smaller cars. Second, U.S. auto workers had accumulated skills that were specialized in the production of particular models, and these tended to be larger vehicles. Third, many auto workers laid off from large-car plants could not take up employment at small-car plants without a costly relocation. Fourth, the dealership network and sales force of the U.S. auto industry had evolved under an era of thriving large-car sales, and they were probably better suited to market and service larger cars. Fifth, the knowledge base and the research and design personnel at U.S. auto companies were specialized in engineering larger cars. The development of smaller, more fuelefficient cars required a costly and time-consuming reorientation of the knowledge base and the development of new skills by research and design personnel.
These remarks suggest how factor specialization and reallocation frictions led to reduced output and employment in the auto industry in the wake of the first OPEC oil price shock. Similar remarks could be fashioned for many other industries. Coupled with the magnitude and widespread impact of oil price shocks over the past 25 years, these remarks also suggest how oil price shocks could cause large aggregate fluctuations by upsetting established patterns of production. Several previous studies investigate the hypothesis that oil price shocks drove large aggregate fluctuations in this way, but earlier work lacks the sectoral detail on job creation and destruction that we exploit. 1 Our empirical framework is designed to evaluate the importance of oil price shocks, and the channels through which they drive economic fluctuations, while simultaneously incorporating a role for monetary policy shocks and a variety of unspecified common and sector-specific disturbances. We use the framework to help assess whether oil shocks affect employment via aggregate 1 See, e.g., Davis (1985) , Loungani (1986) , Mork (1989) and Mork et al. (1994) . Hamilton's (1988) model of reallocation frictions is motivated by the apparent impact of oil price shocks on aggregate economic activity. See Bohi (1989) , Mork (1994) and the conclusion to this paper for references to other work on whether oil price shocks drive aggregate fluctuations by upsetting established patterns of production. or allocative channels. By ''aggregate channels'' we refer to the potential output, income transfer and sticky wage effects stressed by traditional macroeconomic analyses (described in Mork, 1994) and to the effects of oil shocks in aggregative models with imperfectly competitive product markets (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) ).
2 By ''allocative channels'' we refer to the aspects of oil price changes that alter the closeness of the match between the desired and the actual distributions of labor and capital inputs, as in the auto industry example.
To assess whether oil price shocks operate primarily through aggregate or allocative channels, we exploit the decomposition of employment changes into job creation and destruction components. An important virtue of the decomposition is that the allocative and aggregate effects of an oil price shock induce qualitatively different job creation and destruction dynamics. For example, the unfavorable aggregate aspects of an oil price rise reduce creation and increase destruction, whereas the allocative aspects increase both creation and destruction. This qualitative difference serves as one means for assessing which type of mechanism dominates the linkage between oil price shocks and economic fluctuations.
By including measures of the magnitude and direction of oil price movements in our econometric models, we obtain a second means for assessing how oil shocks operate. In particular, we compare the dynamic employment and job flow responses associated with positive oil price shocks to the responses associated with negative price shocks.
3 If oil price shocks matter primarily because they alter the closeness of the match between the desired and actual distribution of factor inputs, then employment responds to the magnitude of the price change, irrespective of the direction of change. Alternatively, if oil price shocks matter primarily because they shift aggregate labor supply or labor demand as in Kim and Loungani (1992) , Tatom (1977, 1981) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) , then employment responds roughly symmetrically to positive and negative oil price shocks.
To carry out our investigations, we estimate sectoral vector autoregressions (VARs) that contain common and sector-specific variables. We specify the VARs so that the oil and monetary shocks and two unspecified common shocks are identical across sectors, but we allow the estimated shock response functions to differ freely across sectors. We also allow for two sector-specific shocks in each VAR. The resulting econometric model can be interpreted as a constrained panel VAR that simultaneously exploits the time-series data for all sectors while allowing for multiple common and sector-specific shocks. Our block-recursive system treats oil price shocks as exogenous. To identify monetary shocks, we extract the component of innovations in an indicator of monetary and credit conditions that is orthogonal to contemporaneous innovations in the oil shock variable and the unspecified common shocks. In a similar manner, we identify sector-specific shocks from the components of sectoral job creation and destruction innovations that are orthogonal to all common shocks.
The next section describes the data, highlights prominent aspects of job creation and destruction behavior, and summarizes how the level and cyclical behavior of job flows relate to sectoral characteristics. Section 3 articulates our econometric framework and spells out our identifying assumptions. We apply the econometric framework in Section 4 to evaluate the relative importance of the various shocks and to estimate dynamic response functions. We find a larger role for oil shocks than monetary shocks in our sample period, much greater short-run sensitivity of destruction than creation to both monetary and oil shocks, sharply asymmetric responses to oil price ups and downs, and pronounced differences among sectors in the size of shock responses.
These response differences prompt an investigation into which sectoral characteristics matter for sensitivity to the shocks. We pursue this matter in Section 5 by relating shock response functions for about 450 detailed manufacturing industries to observable industry characteristics. We find that the cumulative two-year employment response to a positive oil price shock rises sharply (in magnitude) with capital intensity and product durability. It rises with energy intensity over the lower two-thirds of the energy intensity distribution and then flattens out. The cumulative two-year employment response to an adverse monetary shock is typically modest, but it rises with product durability and with the fraction of employment at young plants.
We quantify the number of jobs created and destroyed in response to typical oil and monetary shocks in Section 6. According to our point estimates, a unit standard deviation positive oil shock triggers the destruction of an extra 290,000 production worker jobs and the creation of an extra 30,000 jobs in the first two years after the shock. A unit standard deviation adverse monetary shock triggers the destruction of an extra 150,000 jobs and the creation of 10,000 fewer jobs over two years. After four years, the net employment response to a unit positive oil shock is only 60,000 fewer jobs, but the gross reallocation response amounts to 410,000 jobs or more than 3 percent of manufacturing employment.
Section 6 draws on the detailed sectoral results for the 1972-1988 period to estimate how changes in the industry mix of employment and the energy intensity of production activity have altered the total manufacturing response to oil and monetary shocks over a longer time period that extends through 1996. Section 7 draws together our main findings, sets forth conclusions and points to issues for future research.
Data description

Measurement and basic facts: sectoral job flows
For data on sectoral job flows, we tabulate quarterly job creation and destruction time series from the LRD following . These tabulations reflect plant-level changes in the number of employed production workers in the middle month of each quarter. Job creation is the sum of employment gains at expanding and entering establishments. Job destruction is the sum of employment losses at contracting and exiting establishments. We express job flows as rates by dividing by the simple average of current and previous-period employment. 4 We remove seasonality using sector-specific seasonal dummies.
We consider several sectoral classification schemes: (i) detailed industry, defined by 20 two-digit or 450 four-digit SICs; (ii) energy intensity, defined by deciles of the employment-weighted plant-level distribution of energy costs as a percent of shipments value; (iii) capital intensity, defined by quintiles of the employment-weighted 4-digit industry-level distribution of capital per production worker; (iv) product durability, defined in terms of the 4-digit industrylevel product depreciation rates for consumer goods in Bils and Klenow (1998) ; and (v) establishment size-age categories, defined in terms of employment level and years since first manufacturing employment. Classifications (i) and (ii) are 4 These job creation and destruction measures can be expressed as employment-weighted mean growth rates among growing and declining plants, respectively, where the growth rate is defined as the change in the plant's employment divided by the average of its current and prior period employment. This growth rate measure underlies all of our earlier work on job flows and most of the related literature. As discussed at greater length in , our growth rate measure has several attractive features. First, employment growth and job flow rates defined in this manner aggregate consistently across plants and sectors. Second, our growth rate measure is identical to the conventional measure (change divided by initial employment) up to a first-order Taylor Series approximation and identical to a log change measure up to a second-order Taylor Series approximation. Third, like the log change measure but unlike the conventional measure, our measure is symmetric with respect to employment increases and decreases. Fourth, unlike the conventional and log change measures, our growth rate measure easily accommodates entering, exiting and continuing establishments in a consistent manner, an especially attractive feature when studying the entire distribution of plant-level growth rates. The distinctions among the three growth rate measures are not quantitatively important for the issues addressed in this paper, because they produce very highly correlated values for creation, destruction and net employment growth. For example, the time-series correlation between our measure of the manufacturing employment growth rate and the conventional measure is 0.99989. drawn directly from our earlier work with Schuh, and (iii)-(v) are newly tabulated series for this paper. Looking across industries, the average quarterly job reallocation rate ranges from 7.4 percent in paper and allied products to 13.5 percent in lumber and wood products. Looking at other employer characteristics, the job reallocation rate declines sharply with establishment age and size. The job reallocation rate averages 18.2 percent per quarter for young manufacturing plants (less than 9-13 years old) with fewer than 20 employees, as compared to 7.2 percent for plants with more than 2500 employees.
Another prominent feature of the data is the distinct cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction. Figs. 1 reveal that recessions involve sharp increases in job destruction accompanied by milder declines in job creation in virtually every 2-digit industry and most other sectors. Table 1 confirms this visual impression, showing that the standard deviation of destruction exceeds that of creation for every 2-digit industry and for every other sector except for young manufacturing plants, especially those with fewer than 100 employees. The distinct cyclical dynamics of creation and destruction are quite evident in the plots for major durable goods industries such as primary metals, electrical machinery, nonelectrical machinery and transportation. Table 1 indicates that the relative volatility of job destruction rises with establishment size (conditional on age) and establishment age (conditional on size). It also tends to rise with capital intensity, energy intensity and product durability. The data also show interesting patterns in the time-series mean and volatility of creation and destruction. The volatility of net employment growth and job destruction rates tend to rise with capital intensity and product durability. Conditional on size, younger plants exhibit higher mean rates of creation and destruction and greater volatility of creation, destruction and net growth. Conditional on age, larger plants exhibit sharply lower average rates of creation and destruction. Interestingly, controlling for age, net employment growth is an increasing function of employer size.
Oil price and money-credit measures
In earlier work on the driving forces behind fluctuations in manufacturing job creation and destruction , we considered four indicators of shocks to monetary policy or credit intermediation: a credit mix variable, measured as the ratio of bank loans to the sum of bank loans and commercial paper; the federal funds rate; the term spread between the 10-year constant maturity government bond rate and the federal funds rate; and the quality spread between the six-month commercial paper rate and the six-month treasury bill rate. Each measure is featured in one or more recent papers that investigate the impact of monetary policy and credit market conditions on the economy. 7 We found that all four variables generated similar results and yielded considerable predictive power for total manufacturing rates of job creation and destruction. The quality spread and credit mix variables yielded virtually identical results, and they showed greater predictive power for creation and destruction rates than the other two measures. In view of our earlier findings, we focus on the quality spread variable in this paper. We think of this variable as potentially informative about shocks to monetary policy and credit intermediation and, as a shorthand, refer to it as SPREAD.
Recent work by Hooker (1996a) and Hamilton (1996a) raises questions about the appropriate measure of oil price shocks. Hamilton argues for an oil shock measure that filters out both price declines and price increases that merely offset recent past declines. In a similar vein, Davis (1987) argues that allocative disturbances (including oil shocks) cause more powerful effects on aggregate outcomes when they reinforce, rather than reverse, the direction of recent past allocative disturbances.
We are sympathetic to these arguments, and we construct an oil shock index accordingly. Our index equals the log of the following ratio: the current real oil price divided by a weighted average of real prices in the prior 20 quarters, with weights that sum to one and decline linearly to zero. We measure the real price as the nominal price of crude petroleum deflated by the producer price index. We include the oil shock index and its absolute change in our VARs, which allows us to investigate whether positive and negative oil shocks have asymmetric effects. 8 Fig. 2 plots quarterly time series for the oil shock index, its absolute change, and the interest rate quality spread from 1972:1 to 1988:4. Three major oil shock episodes F two increases and one decrease F stand out clearly. The two oil price increases are accompanied by large increases in the quality spread, but the persistence and volatility of movements in the oil index and the quality spread differ between these two episodes. The quality spread also rises notably in 1987.
Econometric specification and identification
Consider a seven-variable linear stochastic system for a particular sector. Let Y t ¼ ½OIL t ; ABS t ; TPOS t ; TNEG t ; SPREAD t ; POS t ; NEG t 0 be a vector that contains time-t values of the oil shock index, its absolute change, the manufacturing job creation and destruction rates, the interest rate quality spread, and the sectoral job creation and destruction rates, respectively. We assume that Y t has a linear moving average (MA) representation in terms of innovations to structural disturbances, given by
where BðLÞ is an infinite-order matrix lag polynomial, and e t ¼ ½e ot ; e mt ; e at ; e rt ; e ct ; e pt ; e nt 0 is a vector of white noise structural innovations. The elements of e t correspond to time-t values of innovations to the two oil disturbances, two unspecified common disturbances, the SPREAD disturbance, and two sector-specific disturbances, respectively.
When we estimate a VAR on Y t ; we do not immediately recover the matrix lag polynomial, BðLÞ; or the vector of structural innovations, e t : Instead, the estimated VAR yields
8 In , we also generated results using a measure of the real oil price growth rate. Specifically, we calculated the time-t real oil price growth rate as the twelve-month log difference for the middle month of quarter t and included this measure and its absolute value in multivariate VARs. The results using this approach to measuring oil shocks are quite similar to those based on our index, if we end the sample in 1985:4, but the index described in the text yields a larger and more consistent role for oil shocks in samples that extend to 1988:4. Thus, as in recent work by Hooker and Hamilton, the choice among alternative reasonable oil shock measures matters for samples that extend beyond 1985. We also tried using the change in our index and its absolute value and obtained results similar to the ones reported in the text, but they were less stable across subsample periods. Thus, our preferred specification of the oil shock indicators is partly motivated by the stability of the results across sample periods.
where DðLÞ is an infinite-order matrix lag polynomial implied by the estimated coefficients in the VAR representation of Y t ; and Z t ¼ ½o t ; m t ; a t ; r t ; c t ; p t ; n t 0 is the vector of reduced-form innovations. The elements of Z t correspond to timet values of reduced-form innovations to the two oil variables, the manufacturing job creation and destruction rates, the SPREAD variable, and the sectoral job creation and destruction rates, respectively.
Comparing (1) and (2) implies Z t ¼ B 0 e t and BðLÞ ¼ DðLÞB 0 ; so that full knowledge of B 0 would allow us to recover estimates of both BðLÞ and the structural innovations from the estimated VAR parameters. We could then proceed to evaluate the role played by the various shocks as driving forces behind movements in sectoral job creation and destruction. Of course, the time-series data on Y t do not provide full knowledge of B 0 ; so that identification requires additional, a priori information.
We partially identify the structural response functions BðLÞ and the structural innovations e t by placing restrictions on certain elements of DðLÞ; B 0 and the contemporaneous covariance matrix of e t : The restrictions we place on DðLÞ are given by 
where d ij ðlÞ denotes the ij element at lag l of DðLÞ: The restrictions we place on BðLÞ (suppressing time subscripts) are given by
The restrictions we place on the covariance matrix e t are given by:
Under the zero restrictions on DðLÞ in (3), the sector-specific shocks are constrained to affect the variables in the common subsystem in proportion to the sector's share of total manufacturing job creation and destruction. In light of this restriction, our estimated systems are more accurately described as near VARs rather than fully symmetric VARs. The near-VAR specification assures that the oil, SPREAD and unspecified common shocks, ½e ot ; e mt ; e at ; e rt ; e ct ; are identical across sectors. At the same time, the specification allows the last two rows of the response functions BðLÞ to freely vary across sectors. Hence, we can easily relate sectoral differences in the shock response functions to observed sectoral characteristics.
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Assumptions ð4Þ and ð5Þ impose a block recursive structure with four blocks: (i) two oil variables, (ii) total manufacturing job creation and destruction, (iii) SPREAD, and (iv) sectoral job creation and destruction. The block recursive nature of the system suffices to identify the contribution of each block of shocks to fluctuations in total and sectoral job creation and destruction. We do not attempt to achieve identification within blocks, except for our efforts to 9 Michael Horvath explored the sensitivity of our results to relaxations of (3) in his very detailed comments at the July 1997 NBER Economic Fluctuations Program Meeting. For example, he reconstructed the total manufacturing impulse responses shown below in Fig. 3 based on a specification that allows the sector-specific shocks of a leading sector to freely affect creation and destruction outcomes in other sectors. Horvath showed that the patterns depicted in Fig. 3 hold up under this more flexible specification, regardless of the identity of the leading sector. He also showed that sectoral impulse response functions are insensitive to this specification choice.
isolate the magnitude and direction aspects of the oil shock structural response functions.
We take the oil innovations e o and e m to be exogenous in our near-VAR systems, as described by the zero restrictions in Eqs. (4a) and (4b) and the covariance restriction (5a). These assumptions are sufficient to estimate the joint contribution of the oil shocks to the forecast-error variances of all variables in the system.
The unspecified common disturbances e a and e r capture the components of the reduced-form innovations to total manufacturing job creation and destruction that are orthogonal to the oil innovations. In Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) , we interpret the e a and e r shocks as reflecting unobserved aggregate and allocative disturbances that affect the pace of job creation and destruction. The identification strategies we develop in that paper could be implemented here to achieve identification within block (ii) (and likewise within block (iv)). However, we do not pursue strategies for identification within blocks (ii) and (iv) in this paper, and they play no role in the inferences we draw below.
Eq. (4e) identifies the structural money-credit innovation as the component of the reduced-form SPREAD innovation that is orthogonal to innovations in the oil variables and the total job creation and destruction rates. This assumption reflects the view that movements in monetary policy and SPREAD variables often respond in a passive, systematic manner to developments in the real side of the economy. The inclusion of the e c term in (4e) allows for the possibility that some innovations in the SPREAD variable reflect exogenous monetary policy events or other shocks to the intermediation process.
The last two equations in ð4Þ pertain to the sectoral job creation and destruction rates. We allow all common disturbances to contemporaneously affect sectoral job creation and destruction. In addition, we include two unspecified sectoral shocks, e p and e n ; that we do not separately identify.
In closing this section, we stress four appealing features of our specification and identifying assumptions. First, our approach allows for multiple identified and unspecified shocks. Second, our approach identifies common oil and money-credit shocks that hit all sectors, while allowing the shock response functions to vary freely across sectors. Third, our specifications do not prejudge the issue of whether oil shocks influence manufacturing and sectoral employment through allocative or aggregate channels. Instead, we rely on the estimated shock response functions to investigate whether positive and negative oil price shocks have symmetric effects on employment growth, and to investigate whether oil shocks increase both creation and destruction.
Finally, the sectoral near-VAR systems that we estimate separately can be reinterpreted as a constrained panel VAR that simultaneously uses the timeseries data for all sectors. By including lagged values of manufacturing creation and destruction in each sectoral equation, it is as though we included sectoral creation and destruction rates as regressors and constrained their effects to be proportional to the sectoral shares of manufacturing job flows. Thus, we can think of our econometric framework as a collection of distinct near VARs, one for each sector, or as a constrained panel VAR that we estimate one sevenequation block at a time. However, our estimation procedure does not constrain the weighted sum of sectoral creation and destruction responses to equal the total responses. In practice, violations of this adding up constraint are usually small.
Sectoral creation and destruction responses
Summary of variance decompositions
We estimated the sectoral VAR systems on quarterly data from 1973:2 to 1988:4 using four lags of each variable. Table 2 summarizes the contribution of each block of shocks to the variance of the 8-step ahead forecast error for sectoral rates of employment growth and gross job flows. The table entries are employment-weighted average contributions to the forecast-error variance for the indicated sectoral classification schemes. For example, the entry in the first row and column reports that oil shocks account for 22 percent of the variance in the 8-step ahead forecast error of the employment growth rate in the average 2-digit industry.
Oil shocks account for 18-25 percent of the variance in the employment growth across alternative sectoral classifications. The classification by plantlevel energy intensity yields the largest average contribution of oil shocks to net employment growth, job reallocation and job destruction. Indeed, 40 percent of the variance in job reallocation is accounted for by oil shocks when we group plants by energy intensity. This result indicates that much of the job reallocation response to oil shocks occurs within energy-intensity categories.
SPREAD shocks contribute, on average, between 6 and 12 percent of the forecast-error variance in employment growth. The largest average contributions of SPREAD shocks arise for sectoral classifications by capital intensity and plant age-size characteristics.
The unspecified common and sector-specific shocks account for most of the forecast-error variability in net and gross job flow rates. Common shocks are especially important for the energy-intensity classifications, and sector-specific shocks are especially important for the 4-digit industry and product durability breakdowns.
The results in Table 2 make clear that each block of shocks plays a nontrivial role in accounting for the variability of net and gross job flows. The results also show, not surprisingly, that the relative importance of each category of shocks varies somewhat across the sectoral classification schemes. In what follows, we focus on the dynamic response to the identified oil and SPREAD shocks. The unspecified common and sector-specific shocks capture the many other, unobserved shocks that influence employment and job flows. (2) The results reflect estimates of seven-variable near VARs, one for each sector, and the identification assumptions described in the text. (3) Manufacturing and sectoral rates of job creation (POS) and job destruction (NEG) rates are seasonally adjusted prior to estimation.
The dynamic response to oil shocks
We first characterize the dynamic effects of oil shocks on total manufacturing employment growth and gross job flows. Recall that each sectoral near-VAR system contains a common symmetric subsystem (the two oil variables, total manufacturing job creation and destruction, and the SPREAD variable). Fig. 3 displays the oil and SPREAD shock response functions implied by the common subsystem. 10 We focus here on oil price shocks and defer a discussion of SPREAD shocks to the next section.
To generate response functions for positive and negative oil price shocks, we simultaneously perturb the two structural oil innovations, e o and e m : We perturb e o up or down by one standard deviation, and we perturb e m by an amount that satisfies the identity linking the oil shock index to its absolute change. We then trace out the response functions implied by the MA representation of the structural VAR.
11 Fig. 3 shows a large adverse response to a positive oil price shock and very little response to a negative one. Destruction rises sharply and employment growth declines in the aftermath of a positive oil shock, while job creation declines modestly. Peak responses occur four quarters following the shock and involve an employment growth rate nearly one percentage point below the baseline value.
The upper right panel of Fig. 3 isolates the effects of the absolute change component of an oil shock. The response pattern fits the profile of an ''allocative disturbance'' in three respects. First, the short-run employment response is negative, with a peak response at four steps that accounts for about 40 percent of the peak response to an oil price increase. Second, the longer term employment response is approximately zero. In fact, cumulating the first 16 response coefficients for net employment growth yields a long run employment response of only À0:05 percent.
12 Third, the longer term job reallocation 10 The specification and identifying assumptions that underlie Fig. 3 are identical to the ones that underlie Fig. 10 in . Our earlier paper uses a longer sample that begins in 1960. Happily, Fig. 3 is similar to the corresponding figure in the earlier paper.
11 In principle, the MA representation that underlies the oil shock response functions in Fig. 3 depends on assumptions about b mo ; b om and covðe o ; e m Þ: It turns out, however, that reduced-form innovations in the oil shock index and its absolute change are not highly correlated (corrðo; mÞ ¼ À0:17Þ; so that assumptions about these structural parameters matter little. In practice, we derive the MA representation by placing the oil index ahead of its absolute change in the causal ordering; i.e., we set b om ¼ covðe o ; e m Þ ¼ 0:
12 Since we calculate employment growth as creation minus destruction, we are effectively measuring the growth rate as 2Dx t =ðx t þ x tÀ1 Þ; where x denotes the level of employment. This growth rate measure is identical to the log change up to a second-order Taylor series expansion, which means that we can safely sum response function coefficients to obtain the cumulative response. These results suggest that oil shocks influence manufacturing activity through a mixture of aggregate and allocative effects. The employment effects roughly cancel out in response to an oil price decrease, because the allocative and aggregate aspects of the shock work in opposite directions. The short-run employment effects are large and negative in response to an oil price increase, because the two aspects of the shock work in the same direction. The longer term employment response is small for any oil price shock, in line with the view that the economy eventually adjusts fully to the relative price change.
We also examined the sectoral creation and destruction responses to oil shocks for all 51 detailed sectors listed in Table 1 . In the interests of brevity, we display impulse response functions for selected sectors in Fig. 4 and summarize other results. (A full set of sectoral results is available upon request from the authors.)
The detailed results reveal short-run employment declines in response to unanticipated oil price increases in almost every sector. In half of the sectors, the cumulative decline seven quarters after a unit standard deviation positive shock to the price of oil exceeds 2 percent of employment.
The sign pattern of the separate creation and destruction responses is also noteworthy. The cumulative effect of a positive oil shock is typically to increase both job destruction and creation in the two years after the shock. This response pattern points to the reallocative consequences of oil shocks, and it indicates that these effects operate within sectors, as we have defined them.
Another interesting result involves the relative magnitudes of the short-run destruction and creation responses. With the exception of young plants with fewer than 20 employees, the magnitude of the two-year sectoral destruction response is larger F and usually much larger F than the corresponding creation response. Fig. 4 clearly illustrates the greater short-run sensitivity of job destruction to oil shocks. Apparel, rubber and plastics, furniture, primary metals and transportation equipment are among the industries with especially large job destruction responses to oil shocks. In addition, while the relationships are not always monotonic, the results suggest that the asymmetric response of destruction is greater the more energy and capital intensive is the production process and the more durable is the output good.
To examine the statistical significance of the point estimates, we computed Monte Carlo standard errors for the cumulative creation and destruction responses. Only one sector (food) exhibits a cumulative creation response at seven steps (after the shock) that exceeds two standard errors. In contrast, the cumulative step-7 job destruction responses exceed two standard errors for more than a third of the sectors including total manufacturing, food, rubber and plastics, primary metals, fabricated metals and transportation equipment.
Other sectors with statistically significant cumulative destruction responses include the most energy intensive group, the most capital intensive group and large, mature plants.
In another exercise, we compared the actual path of employment growth to the counterfactual path generated by feeding the contemporaneous and seven period. The results of this exercise also indicate that oil shocks played an important role in the deep employment decline of the early 1980s, but that they do not explain the prolonged nature of the contraction. The oil-shock counterfactual generates sectoral employment growth rates that typically turn Fig. 4 (continued) up in 1982, which fits the experience of a few sectors such as apparel, the bottom energy class and the top durability class but is sharply at odds with the continued contraction in many sectors such as rubber and plastics, electrical machinery, primary metals, transportation equipment, the top energy class, and the top capital class. Fig. 4 (continued) 
The dynamic response to SPREAD shocks
Returning to Fig. 3 , we see that job destruction rises and job creation falls in the aftermath of a spread shock. The peak employment growth response occurs 3 quarters after the shock, and its size is about half as large as for a unit positive oil shock. The longer term employment and reallocation responses to the spread shock are modest. At step 15, the cumulative response is an employment decline of À0:48 percent and the reallocation of 1.53 percent of manufacturing jobs. Fig. 4 displays dynamic responses to SPREAD shocks for selected sectors. The full set of (unreported) results show that two-thirds of all sectors exhibit opposite signs for the step-7 cumulative creation and destruction responses to SPREAD shocks. This sign pattern contrasts with the pattern for oil shocks, in which two-thirds of the cumulative creation and destruction responses showed the same sign. Thus, the results suggest that SPREAD shocks have less of a (within-sector) reallocative character than oil shocks.
In another respect, however, the SPREAD shock response functions are similar to the oil shock response functions: the magnitude of the short run response is typically larger for destruction than creation. Twenty percent of the cumulative step-7 destruction responses to a SPREAD shock differ from zero by more than two standard errors, but none of the creation responses do. This aspect of the oil and SPREAD shock response dynamics mirrors the greater cyclical volatility of job destruction that stands out clearly in the time-series plots of the raw data (Figs. 1) .
Two other aspects of the SPREAD shock response results are noteworthy. First, relatively large SPREAD shock responses occur for rubber and plastics, most durable goods industries (especially electrical machinery), and younger plants. Second, young, small plants exhibit response dynamics that differ greatly from other sectors. For these plants, a SPREAD shock triggers little change in job destruction and a comparatively large decline in job creation (Fig. 4) . In this regard, recall from Table 1 that young, small plants are one of the few sectors that exhibit large cyclical fluctuations in job creation relative to job destruction. This pattern in the raw data carries over to the estimated response functions as relatively greater shock sensitivity of job creation.
In other unreported results, we considered a variety of alternative specifications involving monetary and credit variables. First, we experimented with the Federal Funds Rate as an alternative indicator of monetary and credit conditions. Second, we allowed positive and negative SPREAD shocks to have asymmetric effects in like manner to our treatment of oil shocks. Third, we placed SPREAD first in the five-variable common subsystem.
The main character of our results was not affected by these specification changes, but a few findings are worth mentioning. First, alternative treatments of SPREAD have virtually no impact on the results for oil shocks. Second, the impulse response functions depicted in Fig. 3 are qualitatively similar for all of these alternative specifications. Third, using the SPREAD variable leads to a somewhat larger role for monetary-credit shocks than the Federal Funds Rate. Fourth, the results show weak evidence of asymmetric responses to positive and negative SPREAD shocks (with larger responses to positive shocks). Fifth, the quantitative importance of the SPREAD shock is slightly higher when SPREAD is placed first in the VAR subsystem. Given that our main results do not seem unduly sensitive to these specification issues, we continue to focus on our baseline specification.
Which sectoral characteristics matter?
The preceding results identify particular sectors that exhibit unusually large or small shock responses, but the one-way and two-way classification schemes make it difficult to discern how the response depends on sectoral characteristics. For example, SPREAD shocks generate bigger employment responses in several durable goods industries, which tend to be dominated by large, mature plants. SPREAD shocks also generate bigger responses among smaller and, especially, younger plants. Each finding has a ready interpretation, but together they strongly suggest that the results confound the effects of multiple sectoral characteristics.
In this section, we adopt an approach that allows us to control simultaneously for multiple sectoral characteristics that potentially influence the response to SPREAD and oil shocks. We implement our approach in three steps. First, we estimate near-VAR systems for approximately 450 4-digit manufacturing industries over the 1972-1988 period. Second, using the same identifying assumptions as before, we estimate the shock response functions for each 4-digit industry. Third, we regress cumulative responses on industry-level measures of energy intensity, capital intensity, plant size, plant age and product durability. The cross-industry variation in these measures and the large number of 4-digit industries provide leverage for disentangling the roles of the multiple characteristics that influence the shock response functions.
We construct measures of 1972-1988 average industry-level characteristics as follows. Using the Bartelsman-Gray ð1995Þ NBER Productivity database, we measure energy intensity as the ratio of energy costs to total shipments and capital intensity as capital per production worker in 1987 dollars. We summarize the industry-level size distribution by the coworker log, defined as the employment-weighted mean of the log of plant-level employment. To summarize the age distribution of plants, we use the fraction of industry-level employment at mature plants (more than 9-13 years old). We calculate the coworker log and the mature plant fraction directly from plant-level data in the LRD. Some of our regressions also make use of the Bils-Klenow product durability measure, which is available for 106 industries. Table 3 summarizes the statistical significance of the characteristics in explaining industry variation in the step-7 cumulative response of the employment growth rate and the step-15 cumulative response of the excess job reallocation rate. 13 The underlying regressions contain cubic polynomials in the energy, capital, size and age measures. Panel A shows that, with respect to oil shocks, the energy, capital and size variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in accounting for the cross-industry variation in the cumulative employment response. The capital and age variables account for significant variation in the cumulative reallocation response. With respect to SPREAD shocks, the capital and age variables are statistically significant for the cumulative employment response, and the energy and age variables are significant for the cumulative reallocation response.
Since the regression specifications are nonlinear in variables, we display the fitted relationships in Figs. 5A and B. Each panel plots the fitted employment and excess reallocation relationship from the 10th to the 90th percentiles of the indicated regressor, while evaluating the other regressors at medians. The line atop the horizontal axis provides additional information about the distribution of the regressor.
The oil shock response functions now show several clear patterns. The cumulative employment decline triggered by a unit positive oil shock rises sharply from 1.3 percentage points at the 10th percentile of the capital intensity distribution to 2.5 percentage points at the 90th percentile. The magnitude of the oil-shock employment response also rises with energy's cost share over the lower two-thirds of the energy distribution. Industries with mid-sized plants exhibit relatively small employment responses to oil shocks. In addition, the excess reallocation response to oil price shocks is dramatically higher in more capital intensive industries, and it is also higher in industries with many young plants.
The SPREAD shock responses show less evidence of important variation with measured sectoral characteristics. The only noteworthy effect involves the plant age variable. The cumulative 7-step employment decline triggered by a unit positive SPREAD shock is about 1 percentage point for an industry with 92% of employment in mature plants, as compared to about 1.7 percentage points for an industry with 64% of employment in mature plants.
Younger plants are likely to be disproportionately owned by younger firms, and younger firms may have less access to capital markets. In this light, our findings of greater employment responses among younger plants to SPREAD 13 The excess reallocation rate is the gross job reallocation rate minus the absolute value of the net employment growth rate. The excess reallocation response equals the smaller (in magnitude) of the job creation and destruction responses, multiplied by two. shocks recalls earlier work by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) , Kashyap et al. (1994) and others that finds greater sensitivity to monetary shocks among small firms. These studies develop evidence that greater sensitivity among small firms arises because of their more limited access to capital markets. Our findings are consistent with this interpretation, but we regard the plant age measure as a very crude proxy for access to capital markets. A careful assessment of the reasons for greater sensitivity among young plants, and the possible role of capital market imperfections in job creation and destruction dynamics, awaits further research.
We re-estimated the cumulative response regressions for the 106-industry subsample, adding a cubic polynomial in the Bils-Klenow durability measure. We regressed the estimated industry-level cumulative responses to oil and SPREAD shocks on the indicated industry characteristics. The product depreciation rate is available for 106 industries that produce consumer goods. See the text for full descriptions of the variables. Since capital intensity proved to be the most important sectoral characteristic in the full sample, we focus on the role of durability and capital intensity in the subsample. Fig. 6 displays the fitted relationships for the 106-industry subsample. The cumulative employment response to oil shocks is even more sensitive to capital intensity than in the full sample: the step-7 employment decline is almost 3 percentage points greater at the 90th percentile of the capital intensity distribution (for the subsample) than at the 10th percentile. Unreported results reveal that the greater role for capital intensity in the SPREAD shock response functions arises from a different sample, not from conditioning on product durability. The differences between Figs. 5 and 6 in the cumulative response functions for job reallocation also arise from sample differences.
Turning to the role of product durability, Fig. 6 shows a strong effect on the cumulative employment responses to both shocks. Nondurable goods (depreciation rates of 1) show an oil-shock employment response of about À1 percent, as compared to À2:8 percent at the 90th percentile of the durability distribution. There is a similar range of variation in the cumulative employment responses to SPREAD shocks, with larger responses by industries that produce more durable goods. These results are very much in line with the findings and analysis in Bils and Klenow (1998) .
How many jobs are created and destroyed in response to the shocks?
We now quantify the number of jobs created and destroyed in response to oil and monetary shocks. We focus on three questions: How large is the mediumterm (1-2 years) employment response to the shocks? How large is the longer term (4 years) excess job reallocation response? How is the longer term reallocation response apportioned among employment shifts out of manufacturing, employment shifts between sectors within manufacturing, and reallocation within manufacturing sectors? Table 4 speaks to the first two questions. According to Panel A, the cumulative employment response to a unit standard deviation positive oil price shock is tiny at step 3 but exceeds 2 percent of production worker employment at step 7. Almost all of the employment decline between steps 3 and 7 reflects an increase in gross job destruction. Over the next 8 steps, cumulative job destruction declines slightly, while cumulative creation rises from near zero to 1.4 percent of employment. Hence, net job loss is a modest À0:5 percent at step 15, but the cumulative reallocation response exceeds 3 percent of all manufacturing production worker positions (more than 410,000 jobs).
The large job reallocation response at step 15, coupled with a modest change in the level of employment, is evidence that the longer term response to oil shocks shows up mostly as the reallocation of labor (and presumably capital). But the medium-term response involves significant declines in the level of employment, because the destruction of existing jobs 1-2 years after the shock mostly precedes the creation of new jobs 2-4 years after the shock.
Comparing Panels A and B reveals a noteworthy asymmetry in the responses to positive and negative oil price shocks. The cumulative impact on net employment growth at 7 steps is very modest (less than 0.2 percent) for a negative oil shock, whereas a positive shock of equal magnitude yields a cumulative employment decline of more than 2 percent. Cumulating the responses for steps 0-15, a unit positive shock induces an increase in excess job reallocation of almost 3 percent of jobs whereas a unit negative shock induces a decrease of 1.4 percent. This finding does not support the hypothesis that only the size of relative price changes matters for the long run job reallocation responses.
One possible interpretation is that the aggregate aspect of positive and negative oil shocks trigger asymmetric job reallocation responses. For example, in the search equilibrium model of Mortensen (1994) , a negative aggregate shock pushes jobs with low match quality across a destruction threshold and into the pool of unemployed workers, who eventually form new matches and participate in new job creation. A positive aggregate shock, in contrast, does not trigger a wave of destruction and subsequent creation, because it reduces the reservation match quality below which job destruction occurs. This type of nonlinearity in the creation and destruction effects of aggregate shocks fits the asymmetric response of excess reallocation to positive and negative oil shocks in Table 4 .
Panel C in Table 4 reports the estimated effects of the largest oil-shock episode in our sample. Using the innovations for the 1973:4-1973:1 oilprice changes in the estimated VAR, panel C reports estimated cumulative responses. This oil-shock episode has very large estimated effects on Table 4 shows that SPREAD shocks generate more rapid creation and destruction responses than oil shocks and less evidence of reallocative effects. At step 3, a unit standard deviation positive SPREAD shock yields a cumulative creation decline of 0:3 percent and a cumulative destruction increase of 0:5 percent. At step 7, the SPREAD shock generates a small decline in job creation and a cumulative job destruction increase of 1.1 percent.
Panel E reports the estimated effects of the largest SPREAD shock in our sample period, the 1979:3-79:4 period. This period is commonly associated with a significant contraction in monetary policy. This particular episode involves a step-7 cumulative employment decline of more than 3 percent. At 15 steps, the cumulative employment response is a more modest À1:3 percent, and the cumulative excess reallocation response is 2.7 percent of employment. Table 5 shows that the largest oil and monetary shocks in our sample induced large temporary employment declines and a large reallocation of jobs. Because of the modest number of major shocks in our sample, the standard errors on the cumulative responses are quite large, especially at 15 steps. Hence, readers with strong prior views may not be greatly swayed by these results. But, taken at face value, the results point to major longer term reallocative consequences of oil and monetary shocks that are associated with large medium-term downturns in manufacturing employment.
Turning to the third question posed at the beginning of this section, Table 5 apportions the job reallocation response among between-sector and withinsector components. The first column shows the estimated step-15 cumulative job reallocation response generated by the employment-weighted average of the sectoral responses. The remaining columns are generated from the decomposition,
where SUM denotes job reallocation, NET denotes net employment change, and the subscripts index sectors. 14 The first term on the right side of (6) is the overall change in manufacturing employment; the second term captures between-sector employment shifts within manufacturing; and the third term equals the sum of excess job reallocation within sectors. Columns 2-4 in Table  5 show the fraction of the job reallocation response accounted for by these three terms.
About 15-17% of the estimated job reallocation response to a positive oil shock arises from the estimated decline in manufacturing employment except for classifications by capital intensity (4%) and plant age and size (28%). Excess job reallocation within sectors accounts for two-thirds or more of the total job reallocation response, except for the highly detailed 4-digit industry classification and, more surprisingly, the breakdown by plant age and size. Almost 30% of the job reallocation response is accounted for by employment shifts among our 11 size-age categories. In contrast, and rather remarkably, employment shifts among sectors defined in terms of capital intensity and energy intensity account for virtually none of the estimated job reallocation response.
The change in overall manufacturing employment accounts for one-third to more than half the job reallocation response to SPREAD shocks, depending on sectoral classification scheme. The role of within-sectoral excess reallocation is correspondingly smaller for SPREAD shocks, as compared to a positive oil shock. In other words, SPREAD shocks generate smaller reallocative effects than a positive oil shock. 
Changes in the employment structure and shock responses
The preceding sections focus on the 1972-1988 period for reasons of data availability. Fortunately, this sample period covers the three largest oil price shocks in recent decades, which provide some leverage for estimating their effects. Nevertheless, secular changes in the structure of employment might substantially alter the total manufacturing response to oil price changes and other shocks. While we cannot extend our full analysis outside the 1972-1988 period, we can shed some light regarding changes in the overall response sensitivity to oil and monetary shocks.
Quarterly job flow rates for total manufacturing are available through 1993. Using data from 1972 to 1993, we re-estimate the five-equation common subsystem and display the impulse response functions for manufacturing creation and destruction rates in Fig. 7. Comparing Fig. 7 (1972 -1993 to Fig. 3 (1972 Fig. 3 ( -1988 reveals that the qualitative response patterns are the same for both samples. However, oil shock responses are smaller in magnitude for the longer sample period. For example, in both Figs. 3 and 7, the peak response to a positive oil shock occurs after 4 quarters, but the impact in Fig. 7 is about 70 percent of the impact in Fig. 3 . In contrast, the SPREAD shock responses are, if anything, a bit larger for the longer sample period.
Partly motivated by the comparison between Figs. 3 and 7, we investigate two potential sources of time variation in the total manufacturing shock response functions: changes in the industry mix of employment and changes in the energy-intensity of production activity within industries. To address the role of industry mix, we use data on employment shares for each 4-digit industry from 1958 to 1996 and estimated industry-level impulse response functions based on the 1972-1988 sample. By combining these two types of information, we trace out the effect of secular changes in the industry mix on the total manufacturing shock responses. To carry out this exercise, we consider the cumulative employment responses at 7 steps and the cumulative excess reallocation responses at 15 steps. Fig. 8 shows the effect of changes in industry mix on the manufacturing creation and destruction responses. Changes in the industry mix generate a slow upward drift in the employment and excess reallocation sensitivity of the manufacturing sector to SPREAD shocks, which is consistent with bigger estimated responses to SPREAD shocks in the longer sample. In contrast, industry mix changes do not induce a secular trend in the cumulative employment or excess reallocation response to oil shocks. The industry mix changes in the early 1980s generate a rapid decline in the employment sensitivity to oil shocks, but this effect is fully reversed within the decade. Since the mid 1980s, the composition of manufacturing employment has undergone a fairly pronounced shift towards industries that are more sensitive to oil price shocks. Clearly, industry mix changes cannot account for the smaller estimated responses to oil shocks in the longer sample period.
To evaluate the effect of energy-intensity changes within industries, we use the relationship between energy cost shares and oil-shock sensitivity shown in Figs. 5. Recall that we estimated this relationship from industry-level shock response patterns in the 1972-1988 sample period. Using this shock response relationship, we compute the impact of secular changes in industry-level energy cost shares on the total manufacturing response to an oil shock. We consider the change in energy cost shares from 1972 to 1994 for the following reasons. First, 1972 occurs just prior to the first OPEC oil shock. Second, 22 years is ample time for the adoption of energy-conserving technologies that may have become available in the aftermath of the big oil shocks in the 1970s. Third, both years are part of business cycle upturns. Finally, the real price of energy is approximately the same in 1994 as in 1972, which diminishes the scope for confusion between energy substitution and intensity effects.
To our considerable surprise, the industry-level data show that the fixedweight average energy cost share rose by nearly a quarter from 1972 to 1994 F from 0.015 to 0.019 using 1972 weights, and from 0.013 to 0.017 using 1994 weights. In other words, the average 4-digit industry shifted toward more energy-intensive production technologies between 1972 and 1994. In line with this fact, we also find that the 1994-1972 changes in the industry-level energy cost shares raise the total manufacturing response to an oil shock. For example, based on the 1972 energy cost shares, we estimate that a unit standard deviation positive innovation to the oil shock variable causes manufacturing employment to decline by 1.77 percentage points over seven quarters. Based on the 1994 energy cost shares (and the same industry employment shares), we estimate that the same shock generates a cumulative employment decline of 1.97 percentage points. In short, we cannot account for a smaller response to oil shocks in terms of a shift to less energy-intensive technologies within manufacturing industries.
Summary and conclusions
We organize our main findings and conclusions under several headings:
Descriptive characterization of gross job flows Gross job flows are large in every sector we consider, averaging 10.7 percent of employment per quarter. Job destruction shows much greater cyclical variation than job creation in almost every sector. The clear exceptions, accounting for 7 percent of manufacturing employment, are young plants (less than 9-13 years old) with fewer than 100 employees. In addition, the relative volatility of job destruction tends to rise with capital intensity, product durability, and plant age and size.
Asymmetric shock response of creation and destruction
Both oil and monetary shocks generate much greater short-run responses in job destruction than job creation in almost every sector. One plausible explanation for the greater volatility of job destruction and its greater sensitivity to common shocks is a rising short-run supply schedule for new capital goods. Caballero and Hammour (1994) develop this point, and Goolsbee (1997 Goolsbee ( , 1998 provides evidence that the short-run supply price of capital goods rises steeply. Campbell and Fisher (2000) develop a different theory that explains how certain forms of employment adjustment costs can make job destruction more sensitive to shocks that job creation. Foote (1998) develops the idea that the declining employment trend in most manufacturing industries induces a bunching of plants near the job destruction threshold, which makes job destruction relatively responsive to common shocks. Search frictions in labor markets provide yet another candidate explanation for this asymmetry (Mortensen, 1994) .
The importance of oil shocks
Oil price shocks account for about 20-25% of the variance in 2-year-ahead forecast errors for manufacturing employment growth under our identifying assumptions, about twice as much as monetary shocks. The largest oil shock in our sample (1973:3-1973:4) caused an estimated eight percent decline in manufacturing employment within two years.
We found some hints of a diminished response to oil shocks in the 1990s. However, we could not account for a diminished response in terms of either changes in the industry mix of manufacturing employment or a shift to energyconserving technologies within manufacturing.
Asymmetric employment response to oil price ups and downs Employment growth declines sharply following a large oil price increase but changes little following a large oil price decrease. A unit standard deviation positive oil shock leads to a cumulative two-year employment decline of about 2 percent, ten times bigger than the estimated response to the same size negative oil shock.
Several other studies, most based on different econometric specifications and identifying assumptions, also conclude that oil price increases have larger effects on aggregate or regional activity than oil price decreases. See Mork (1989) , Mory (1993) , Lee et al. (1995) , Hamilton (1996b) , Hooker (1996b) and Davis et al. (1997) . In light of this work, we view the evidence for asymmetric responses to oil price ups and downs as well established (for the United States).
Which characteristics matter for shock response size?
The employment sensitivity to a positive oil shock rises sharply with capital intensity and product durability. It also rises with energy's share of total costs over the lower two-thirds of the energy cost distribution. The magnitude of the two-year employment response to monetary shocks rises sharply with product durability. It also rises with the fraction of employment in young plants.
Reallocative consequences of oil shocks
Our results point to important reallocative consequences of oil price shocks. For example, we estimate that the 1973:3-1973:4 oil shock episode caused job reallocation activity to rise by an amount equal to 11 percent of employment over the following 15 quarters. More than 80% of this reallocation response reflects greater excess job reallocation within manufacturing.
In separate work, Davis et al. (1997) find that oil shocks have been a major driving force behind regional employment and unemployment fluctuations in the United States since 1972. The cross-state dispersion of cyclical unemployment rose sharply in the aftermath of each major oil shock in 1973-74, 1979-80 and 1986 .
Oil shocks and fluctuations: what is the story?
Most equilibrium business cycle models (as reviewed in Cooley, 1995) fail to offer any explanation for the sharply asymmetric response to oil price ups and downs. Two exceptions are Atkeson and Kehoe's (1994) analysis of energy intensity choice in a model with differentiated putty-clay capital goods and Hamilton's (1988) analysis of labor market reallocation frictions in a multisector model. 15 Equilibrium models with reallocation frictions offer the promise of simultaneously explaining (i) the asymmetric aggregate response to oil price ups and downs, (ii) the magnitude of the medium-term aggregate response to oil shocks, (iii) the large-scale job reallocation activity triggered by large oil price increases, and (iv) the large role of oil shocks in regional unemployment fluctuations.
Research to date has not pinned down the precise nature of the reallocation frictions that influence the aggregate response to oil price changes and other shocks. Do the frictions mainly involve worker reallocation, capital reallocation, or the development of new organization capital to facilitate business expansion and entry? How important are relocation costs, human capital acquisition, rigidities in the employment relationship, unemployment insurance, and the appropriability of specific investments? 16 Lastly, we emphasize that oil shock response magnitudes vary systematically with observable sectoral characteristics, in some respects sharply. This response heterogeneity is another challenge to business cycle modeling and a useful source of information for assessing model performance.
